Friday, 30 August 2013

133008: GS Mains 13 : SYRIA Crisis : Hit Him Hard

Hit him hard : SYRIA 

Present the proof, deliver an ultimatum and punish Bashar Assad for his use of chemical weapons









THE grim spectacle of suffering in Syria—100,000 of whose people have died in its civil war—will haunt the world for a long time. Intervention has never looked easy, yet over the past two and a half years outsiders have missed many opportunities to affect the outcome for the better. Now America and its allies have been stirred into action by President Bashar Assad’s apparent use of chemical weapons to murder around 1,000 civilians—the one thing that even Barack Obama has said he would never tolerate.
The American president and his allies have three choices: do nothing (or at least do as little as Mr Obama has done to date); launch a sustained assault with the clear aim of removing Mr Assad and his regime; or hit the Syrian dictator more briefly but grievously, as punishment for his use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Each carries the risk of making things worse, but the last is the best option.
No option is perfect
From the Pentagon to Britain’s parliament, plenty of realpolitikers argue that doing nothing is the only prudent course. Look at Iraq, they say: whenever America clumsily breaks a country, it ends up “owning” the problem. A strike would inevitably inflict suffering: cruise missiles are remarkably accurate, but can all too easily kill civilians. Mr Assad may retaliate, perhaps assisted by his principal allies, Iran, Russia and Hizbullah, the Lebanese Shias’ party-cum-militia, which is practised in the dark arts of international terror and which threatens Israel with 50,000 rockets and missiles. What happens if Britain’s base in Cyprus is struck by Russian-made Scud missiles? Or if intervention leads to some of the chemical weapons ending up with militants close to al-Qaeda? And why further destabilise Syria’s neighbours—Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq?
Because doing nothing carries risks that are even bigger (seearticle). If the West tolerates such a blatant war crime, Mr Assad will feel even freer to use chemical weapons. He had after all stepped across Mr Obama’s “red line” several times by using these weapons on a smaller scale—and found that Mr Obama and his allies blinked. An American threat, especially over WMD, must count for something: it is hard to see how Mr Obama can eat his words without the superpower losing credibility with the likes of Iran and North Korea.
And America’s cautiousness has cost lives. A year ago, this newspaper argued for military intervention: not for Western boots on the ground, but for the vigorous arming of the rebels, the creation of humanitarian corridors, the imposition of no-fly zones and, if Mr Assad ignored them, an aerial attack on his air-defence system and heavy weaponry. At the time Mr Assad’s regime was reeling, most of the rebels were relatively moderate, the death toll was less than half the current total and the conflict had yet to spill into other countries. Some of Mr Obama’s advisers also urged him to arm the rebels; distracted by his election, he rebuffed them—and now faces, as he was repeatedly warned, a much harder choice.
So why not do now what Mr Obama should have done then, and use the pretext of the chemical strike to pursue the second option of regime change? Because, sadly, the facts have changed. Mr Assad’s regime has become more solid, while the rebels, shorn of Western support and dependent mainly on the Saudis and Qataris, have become more Islamist, with the most extreme jihadis doing much of the fighting. An uprising against a brutal tyrant has kindled a sectarian civil war. The Sunnis who make up around three-quarters of the population generally favour the rebels, whereas many of those who adhere to minority religions, including Christians, have reluctantly sided with Mr Assad. The opportunity to push this war to a speedy conclusion has gone—and it is disingenuous to wrap that cause up with the chemical weapons.
So Mr Obama should focus on the third option: a more limited punishment of such severity that Mr Assad is deterred from ever using WMD again. Hitting the chemical stockpiles themselves runs the risk both of poisoning more civilians and of the chemicals falling into the wrong hands. Far better for a week of missiles to rain down on the dictator’s “command-and-control” centres, including his palaces. By doing this, Mr Obama would certainly help the rebels, though probably not enough to overturn the regime. With luck, well-calibrated strikes might scare Mr Assad towards the negotiating table.
Do it well and follow through
But counting on luck would be a mistake, especially in this fortune-starved country. There is no tactical advantage in rushing in: Mr Assad and his friends will have been preparing for contingencies, including ways to hide his offending chemical weapons, for many months. Mr Obama must briskly go through all sorts of hoops before ordering an attack.
The first task is to lay out as precisely as anybody can the evidence, much of it inevitably circumstantial, that Mr Assad’s forces were indeed responsible for the mass atrocity. America’s secretary of state, John Kerry, was right that Syria’s refusal to let the UN’s team of inspectors visit the poison-gas sites for five days after the attack was tantamount to an admission of guilt. But, given the fiasco of Iraq’s unfound weapons, it is not surprising that sceptics still abound. Mr Obama must also assemble the widest coalition of the willing, seeing that China and Russia, which is increasingly hostile to Western policies (see next leader), are sure to block a resolution in the UN Security Council to use force under Chapter 7. NATO—including, importantly, Germany and Turkey—already seems onside. The Arab League is likely to be squared, too.
And before the missiles are fired, Mr Obama must give Mr Assad one last chance: a clear ultimatum to hand over his chemical weapons entirely within a very short period. The time for inspections is over. If Mr Assad gives in, then both he and his opponents will be deprived of such poisons—a victory for Mr Obama. If Mr Assad refuses, he should be shown as little mercy as he has shown to the people he claims to govern. If an American missile then hits Mr Assad himself, so be it. He and his henchmen have only themselves to blame.

1305: GS Mains 13 Probable Question : The way forward in Assam

The way forward in Assam......................Aug 24, 2013

The Manmohan Singh government’s decision to carve Telangana out of Andhra Pradesh has given fresh impetus to statehood demands particularly in eastern India. At least four ethnic groups have begun to press their claims for separate States to be carved out of Assam. The Bodos, the Karbi, Dimasas and Koch-Rajbongshis are up in arms in support of their respective demands.

Background

Assam issue

The demand for Bodoland, a separate state in Western Assam, is primarily based on the conflict over land resources between the ethnic Bodos and other communities in the region; the Bodos are also demanding statehood based on ethnic identity. The Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD), an autonomous area for the Bodo tribes created in western Assam under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, has seen at least four violent confrontations between the Bodo tribes and Bengali Muslims, considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, in the past two decades. In the 19th and early 20th century, policies of the British administration on land utilisation and settlement of people brought from outside Assam to work in tea plantations and farmlands led to massive demographic changes in the region. The Bodos and adivasis practised shifting cultivation or jhum, but the migrants from East Bengal knew modern methods of farming using a plough. They were settled in what the British had termed as wasteland. But the land was actually grazing reserves and jhum land. Since the 1960s, there has been a demand for a separate state of Bodoland after regulations failed to protect the Bodos from land alienation.

Why are calls for a separate state recognised as impractical?

One, the territories being demanded by the different groups in pursuit of their own ethnically, homogeneous provinces actually overlap with one another. Moreover, Assam’s own territorial issues with more than one of its neighbouring States remain unresolved. Third, these conflicting and often competing political aspirations make for a toxic cauldron, predicated as they are on the dangerous assumption that it is not possible or desirable to create multi-ethnic or multicultural provinces in which the rights of ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities are constitutionally guaranteed and administratively ensured.

Road ahead

 Strengthening the autonomous, administrative divisions in Assam established on the basis of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. Currently, these are the Bodoland Territorial Council, the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council and the Dima Hasao Autonomous District Council.
 In addition, there are six notified tribal autonomous councils where the territory has not been specified. One of the sticking points with regard to the latter group relates to dual authority owing to the simultaneous existence of panchayati raj structures. This needs to be addressed suitably.
As in Tripura, the functioning of democratic processes at grass-roots level ought to be ensured in Assam. The sensitive handling of grievances over funding, and the protection that needs to be extended over issues of language, culture and land is essential. Powers and functions consistent with local customs, traditions and needs have to be conferred on tribal autonomous systems.

Demands for Separate States

In Uttar Pradesh, there have been demands for Awadh Pradesh, Poorvanchal, Bundelkhand and Pachimanchal or Harit Pradesh. There is also demand for creation of a Braj Pradesh, consisting of Agra division and Aligarh division of Uttar Pradesh and districts of Bharatpur and Gwalior from Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. A demand for creation of Bhojpur comprising areas of eastern UP, Bihar and Chhattisgarh has also been received by the home ministry. There has been an old demand for creation of a separate Vidarbha by curving out the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra. The most vocal demands for separate states came from Gorkhaland, by curving out Darjeeling and its adjoining areas in West Bengal. Demands for Bodoland, comprising Bodo dominated areas in Western Assam, and a separate state of Karbi Anglong, comprising the Karbi tribals living areas under Karbi Anglong autonomous district in Assam are also pending with the Centre.

There is a demand for Mithilanchal comprising Maithili speaking regions of Bihar and Jharkhand. The Centre has received demand for creation of Saurashtra by curving that region out of Gujarat. The Dimasa people of Northeast have been demanding a separate state called Dimaraji or Dimaland comprising the Dimasa inhabited areas of Assam and Nagaland. There is a demand for creation of Kongu Nadu comprising parts of southwest of Tamil Nadu, southeast of Karnataka and east of
Kerala. Demand for creating a Coorg state, comprising the Coorg region of Karnataka has also come to the Centre. Representation has also been s received for creation of separate Kosal state comprising some districts of Odisha, parts of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.

There is a demand for Tulu Nadu comprising a region on the border between Karnataka and Kerala. The demand for separate Kukiland, comprising Kuki tribal inhabited areas in Manipur has also been raised. A demand for creation of Konkan, comprising Konkani speaking part of Western India along the Arabian sea coastline has also been raised. There has been a demand for creation of Kamtapur comprising some districts of West Bengal, including Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri. Some people from Garo regions of Meghalaya are demanding for a new state of Garoland. Furthermore, there is a demand for a separate Eastern Nagaland by curving out some parts of the north eastern state. The demand for creation of a Union Territory for Ladakh is also pending with the home ministry.

Reasons for Clamour

All these demands are from regions which are poor in despite being rich in natural resources. In addition, disputes exist over sharing and utilisation of natural resources with the mother states. Linguistic and cultural reasons, which were the primary basis for creating new states in the country, have now become secondary in most of these cases. Post Independence, it was people speaking the same language who got together to raise demands for new states. States such as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana were born as a consequence of the demand for separate statehood based on language. Even Andhra Pradesh, which is reluctant to part with Telangana, was created by re-adjusting the boundaries of the Telugu-speaking parts of the erstwhile Madras presidency with the Nizam's dominions or Telangana.

But language was not the basis for the formation of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in 2000 and now Telangana. All the three states formed in 2000 were richer in natural resources than their mother states but were more backward. Uttarakhand had a forest cover of 43 percent, Chattisgarh 42 and Jharkhand has 25 percent of the states' land area. Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand were extremely rich in mineral resources and Uttarakhand had huge growth potential to tap from its river systems. It was the political apathy of the mother states that forced people in these regions to demand for separate states. Similarly, Telangana has 45 percent of Andhra’s forest cover, 68 per cent of the catchment area of the Krishna River and 79 percent catchment area of the Godavari river, but people complain they have hardly got a share of benefit arising out of the development of Andhra Pradesh.

Arguments in favour of smaller states
 Better growth is observed in the newly created states, such as Jharkhand and Chattisgarh compared to the parent states during the 10th FYP period.
 Better democratic governance
 Greater awareness on local needs
 linguistic compatibility and cultural homogeneity
 Better management, implementation and allocation of public resources in provisioning basic social and economic infrastructure services.
 Easy communicability
 Gains for the electorates in terms of better representation of their preferences in the composition of the government.
Arguments against smaller states
 partition anxiety
 Fear the rise of regional and linguistic fanaticism as threats to national unity and integrity.
 Many believe that bigger states ensure cohesion and stability
 Susceptible to commercial pressure for limited resources
 Migration
 Violence

Questions
 Smaller states can augment the growth of the country. Comment critically on the statement.
 Why can bigger states better the integrity prospects of a nation if regional imbalances are addressed? Suggest your ways to deal with such inequalities.

References
 http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/the-way-forward-in-assam/article5052988.ece
 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-04/india/41057301_1_creation-new-states-least-50-states
 http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/fight-over-regional-resources-drive-demand-new-states
 http://www.lokniti.org/pdfs_dataunit/A.Kumar.pdf

1304: IAS Mains 2013 Probable Question: India presses U.S. for renewal of GSP scheme

GS MAINS 2013 special : Editor - Desk of PEARSON ETEN IAS (www.etenias.com) : Puneet

India presses U.S. for renewal of GSP scheme  Aug 21, 2013

India has taken up with United States the issue for immediate renewal of the legal authorisation of the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme, which expired on July 31 this year, to avoid any adverse impact on trade exchanges between the two countries.

Background : What is Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)?

The Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP, is a formal system of exemption from the more general rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), (formerly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT). Specifically, it's a system of exemption from the most favored nation principle (MFN) that obliges WTO member countries to treat the imports of all other WTO member countries no worse than they treat the imports of their "most favored" trading partner. In essence, MFN requires WTO member countries to treat imports coming from all other WTO member countries equally, that is, by imposing equal tariffs on them, etc. GSP exempts WTO member countries from MFN for the purpose of lowering tariffs for the least developed countries, without also lowering tariffs for rich countries.

The United States and GSP
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a U.S. trade program designed to promote economic growth in the developing world by providing preferential duty-free entry for up to 4,800 products from 129 designated beneficiary countries and territories. GSP was instituted on January 1, 1976, by the Trade Act of 1974. It helps in keeping products `made in America’ competitive for both domestic consumption as well as U.S. exports. The U.S. jobs and corporate interests are equally linked to the renewal of GSP program.

How would GSP aid trade prospects of the third world?
The GSP program helps developing countries expand their economies by increasing exports to the U.S. It also aids U.S. businesses by lowering the cost of imported goods that are used as inputs in value-added US production. U.S. businesses imported $19.9 billion worth of products under the GSP program in 2012, including many inputs used in U.S. manufacturing. As per the recently released Trade Policy Agenda of the U.S. administration, helping developing countries grow and expand their economies through trade would also help the U.S. by providing its exporters greater opportunity to sell products to billions of new consumers abroad.

GSP Renewal & India
Experts are of the view that timely renewal of GSP is very important to maintain stable bilateral trade between the two countries and to avoid uncertainty in quoting/bidding for any new business which will adversely affect the trade. The U.S. holds 16% of India’s total services imports. Indian imports of US services is expected to rise sharply in the coming years as India’s middle class market expands and key services sectors bring in further reforms.

References :

# http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-presses-us-for-renewal-of-gsp scheme/article5044988.ece
# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_System_of_Preferences
# https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/266/~/generalized-system-of-preferences-%28gsp%29


Questions
1. Describe what is called the Generalised system of preferences?
2. Why is India keen to renew the Generalised System of Preferences with US on the backdrop of a depreciating rupee?

Thursday, 22 August 2013

0813:Opinion : Can Egypt Learn From Thailand?


Can Egypt Learn From Thailand?

New York Times :  August 22, 2013
BANGKOK was rocked by anti-government demonstrations earlier this month — once a depressingly familiar sight. But that bad news shouldn’t overshadow the good. Disruptive protests may have been all too common in Thailand just a short while ago, but in the last two years, they’ve become an anomaly. The country has gone from a virtual wreck to a booming, and relatively stable, success story. Figuring out how it’s managed to do that is important, and not just for Thailand’s 65 million citizens. For if a place this polarized can pull itself back from the brink, other bitterly divided societies might be able to as well.
To get a sense of how far and fast Thailand has come, consider its recent past. Marketed to tourists as the land of a thousand smiles, Thailand spent most of the last decade fighting with itself.
The trouble really began in 2006, when the military, in connivance with royalists and the courts, overthrew the populist prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The coup ignited years of running street battles between citizen armies of “yellow shirts” — defenders of the old, semifeudal order — and “red shirts,” Thaksin supporters among the rural and urban poor. Political power changed hands four more times in four years. In January 2010, the police responded to enormous red-shirt protests by killing over 90 demonstrators, injuring 2,400 others and jailing hundreds. The economy went into a tailspin.
Then, in August 2011, Mr. Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra became prime minister. And today, barely halfway through her four-year term, Thailand looks like a different country.
According to Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley, the economic outlook is the brightest in 15 years: the currency is up, land prices have climbed and the stock market has more than quadrupled since 2008. Tourists have returned, and the streets (despite the August flare-ups) are mostly quiet.
So how did Ms. Yingluck, initially considered a mere proxy for her exiled brother, do it? The formula turns out to be deceptively simple: provide decent, clean governance, compromise with your enemies and focus on the economy.
Ms. Yingluck understood that she’d never accomplish her broader agenda and improve life for the poor unless she could first calm the place down and complete a full term in office. And to do that, she had to give all Thais a stake in her success. So she began a bold economic stimulus and reform campaign. Some of her moves, like a 40 percent minimum-wage hike and subsidies for car buyers, were aimed directly at her lower-class base. But others, such as $67 billion of infrastructure spending and cuts to personal and corporate taxes, have benefited the wealthy as well.
She also sought to make peace politically. She has courted opponents, holding respectful meetings with the powerful and popular king — and even with the general allegedly behind the coup against her brother.
According to Thitinan Pongsudhirak of Chulalongkorn University, Ms. Yingluck has brought the elites onside by offering a tacit bargain: she preserves their privileges and they let her hold onto power.
Thus she has left the military alone, even recently naming herself defense minister so she could ensure that no one would mess with the army’s prerogatives. She has avoided challenging the Constitution, including the infamous lèse-majesté laws that ban criticism of the monarchy. She has kept corruption, a perennial problem in Thailand, to a minimum. And she has ensured that her brother, whom the aristocracy still fears and loathes, remains in exile.
This, in many ways, is an ugly deal. It means Ms. Yingluck must tolerate undemocratic checks on her power and the repression of free speech. Despite an amnesty law now being debated in Parliament, some of her red-shirt supporters are angry that she hasn’t done more for the families of those killed and imprisoned by the military-backed government in 2010.
It’s also a fragile bargain. Thailand’s recovery could easily unravel. Die-hard yellow shirts have pounced on the prime minister’s mistakes, like a scheme to boost the price of rice that backfired spectacularly. Other dangers loom: the economy is still too export-dependent, and while everyone is getting wealthier, inequality is growing.
Ms. Yingluck hasn’t erased Thailand’s dividing lines so much as papered them over, and the underlying power struggle could erupt again at any time — especially if her brother returns or if the king, now 85, dies. But the longer Thailand remains at peace, and its economy keeps growing, the greater the odds that real democratic politics will take hold, so that when Thailand does finally confront its divisions, it will do so through ballots, not street battles.
Indeed, the flaws in Ms. Yingluck’s grand bargain are part of its genius. The fact that everyone is irritated by the truce she’s negotiated is a good sign, not a bad one: it means nobody is getting everything he wants.
That’s how compromise is supposed to work. It may seem messy; it is. But it’s the kind of mess that other countries like Egypt or Venezuela or Zimbabwe can only envy right now.

0813: National : Cure over India's Poverty


Rival Economists in Public Battle Over Cure for India’s Poverty

Mansi Thapliyal/Reuters
The role of the Indian government in programs like this one, in which a government-run school provides meals to the poor, is one area in which Amartya Sen and Jagdish Bhagwati disagree.
By GARDINER HARRIS   Published: August 21, 2013
Her name is Rohini, and other than pleading for bread, she had little to say when asked about her life. Instead, she threaded her way through thick traffic to her mother, Kamlesh, who on a recent rainy day was carrying one of Rohini’s sisters, a toddler with a cloudy eye and a disturbingly quiet demeanor.NEW DELHI — She is 7 years old, covered in dirt and spends her days asking for food from pedestrians and drivers in one of this city’s central business districts.
“We don’t have the money to send the kids to school,” Kamlesh said simply.
India’s inability to pull Kamlesh and hundreds of millions of others out of desperate poverty despite decades of robust economic growth has been one of history’s great governance failures and economic mysteries.
Does India simply need more time for growth to work its magic, or is there something fundamentally wrong with its formula? Do improvements in health and literacy create growth or simply derive from it? And would India’s people have better lives if the government focused on improving workers’ skills or on bettering investors’ opportunities?
Those are some of the questions behind an unusually nasty fight between two of this nation’s greatest economists. It is a fight that has echoes in poor countries across the globe.
The battle between Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize winner and Harvard professor, and Jagdish Bhagwati, an eminent professor at Columbia University, has broken out just as India’s economy seems to be coming undone. The rupee has plunged to historical lows against the dollar, and extraordinary efforts by the government to stem the slide, including limits on investments abroad by Indian companies, appear to be having little effect. Growth has fallen to 5 percent annually, and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently admitted that it was unlikely to snap back soon. Foreign investors are turning away, and the nation’s stock market has recently swooned.
Into this combustible mix came Mr. Sen and Mr. Bhagwati.
A courtly man with a cackling laugh, Mr. Sen, 79, is one of India’s greatest living intellectuals. His speeches are thronged, his pronouncements make news and college students give him the kind of rock-star adulation that economists in the United States may never know.
Mr. Sen returned to India this summer to promote his new book, “An Uncertain Glory,” co-written with Jean Drèze. In an interview, he said that he had no idea that his book tour would make national political news or that he would be forced to defend himself against his old rival, Mr. Bhagwati.
After Mr. Sen made critical comments about an opposition politician, he was denounced by Hindu nationalists. But in an interview, he said that those who view him as sympathetic to the governing Indian National Congress Party have probably not read his book, which is a searing indictment of India’s present government and every previous one.
In the book, Mr. Sen argues that India, almost alone among emerging Asian nations, has failed to invest substantially in the health and welfare of its people. This failure could doom its economy and people, he says, because a country’s future growth depends just as much on its social infrastructure as its physical state.
India’s economy grew nearly 8 percent annually in the past 10 years, second only to China among major economies. This improved incomes for hundreds of millions and created a growing middle class that in recent years has thronged Delhi’s streets in protests about corruption and gang rapes. Meeting the growing expectations of this middle class has become a potent political issue.
But Mr. Sen argues that India’s growth has failed to translate into substantially better lives for hundreds of millions of others. He points out that countries like Bangladesh, which have grown far more slowly and have much lower income levels, have performed better on key indicators like life expectancy.
“Living conditions in the poorer half of India are not much better, if at all, than in the poorer half of Africa,” Mr. Sen wrote.
Indeed, nearly a third of all newborn deaths occur in India. One in three malnourished children are Indian, and rates of malnutrition are higher in India than in sub-Saharan Africa. Such facts serve as the core of Mr. Sen’s book, and they are the kind of realities that much of India’s elite have trouble even discussing, he wrote.
 “Rapid economic growth has not achieved much on its own during the last 20 years or so to reduce India’s horrendous levels of child undernourishment or to enhance child immunization rates,” he wrote. These problems are hardly addressed — some say even worsened — by miserable government nutrition, education and health care systems, but Mr. Sen’s prescription is to expand these compromised programs.
“There has been a kind of write-off of public institutions by this administration, and they think the only thing that works is business, so they think the more we put in the hands of business the better,” he said. “That’s a disastrous position to take.” This argument is one that Mr. Bhagwati and his co-author on “Why Growth Matters,” Arvind Panagariya, denounce as not only mistaken but dangerous, since they view money spent on government programs as largely wasted.
Mr. Bhagwati, who is also 79, is one of the world’s great trade economists, but he has lived in the shadow of Mr. Sen’s Nobel for much of his professional life, and it clearly irks him. If  his written criticism of Mr. Sen’s work is shrill, his verbal criticism is downright nasty. “My impatience with him is that he is obfuscating things constantly,” Mr. Bhagwati said in one of his less incendiary descriptions.
To Mr. Bhagwati, India’s myriad problems have less to do with poor health and literacy than a poor investment climate. Give people jobs and money and they will invest in their own education and health, he said. Mr. Bhagwati’s embrace of the private sector is widely shared in India. Only the poorest send their children to government schools and hospitals, and the central government now promotes public-private partnerships.
Some economists in India resolve the debate by saying that both have good ideas but go too far with them.
“Both guys are at the extremes of the spectrum,” said Ajay Shah, a professor at theNational Institute of Public Finance and Policy in New Delhi. “We need to reinvest in some government programs and end others altogether.”

0813: Economy : Current Account Deficit : India Woes

India in trouble : The reckoning

Why India is particularly vulnerable to the turbulence rattling emerging markets


ON THE morning of August 


17th most of India’s economic policymakers gathered in the prime minister’s house in Delhi. They were there to launch an official economic history of 1981-97, a period which included the balance-of-payments crisis of 1991. The mood was tense. India, said Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, faced “very difficult circumstances”. “Does history repeat itself?” asked Duvvuri Subbarao, the outgoing head of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). “As if we learn nothing from one crisis to another?”
The day before Indian financial markets had had their rockiest session for many years. The rupee sank and stockmarkets tumbled. Money-market rates rose. The shares of banks thought to be either full of bad debts or short of deposit funding fell sharply. The sell-off had been made worse by new capital controls introduced on August 14th in response to incipient signs of capital flight. They reduce the amount Indian residents and firms can take out of the country. Foreign investors took fright, fearful that India might freeze their funds too, much as Malaysia did during its crisis in 1998.

India is not being singled out. Since May, when the Federal Reserve first said it might slow the pace of its asset purchases, investors have begun adjusting to a world without ultra-cheap money. There has been a great withdrawal of funds from emerging markets, where most currencies have fallen by 5-15% against the dollar in the past three months. Bond yields have risen from Brazil to Thailand. Some governments have intervened. On July 11th Indonesia raised its benchmark interest rate to bolster its currency. On August 21st its president said he would soon announce further measures to ensure stability.
India’s authorities have since ruled that out. But markets keep sliding. On August 20th the RBI said it would intervene to try to calm bond yields. The rupee has dropped to over 64 to the dollar, an all-time low and 13% below its level three months ago. It is widely agreed the country is in its worst economic bind since 1991.
India, Asia’s third-biggest economy, is more vulnerable than most, however. Economic news has disappointed for two years, with growth falling to 4-5%, half the rate seen during the 2003-08 boom. It may fall further. Consumer-price inflation remains stubborn at 10%. A drive by Palaniappan Chidambaram, the finance minister, to push through a package of reforms and free big industrial projects from red tape has not worked. An election is due by May 2014, adding to uncertainty.
India’s dependence on foreign capital is also high and has risen sharply. The current-account deficit soared to almost 7% of GDP at the end of 2012, although it is expected to be 4-5% this year. External borrowing has not risen by much relative to GDP—the ratio stands at 21% today—but debt has become more short-term, and therefore riskier. Total financing needs (defined as the current-account deficit plus debt that needs rolling over) are $250 billion over the next year. India’s reserves are $279 billion, giving a coverage ratio of 1.1 times. That has fallen sharply from over three times in 2007-08 (see chart 1) and leaves India looking weaker than many of its peers (see chart 2).
It is therefore vital that foreign equity investors stay put. They own perhaps $200 billion of shares at current prices. They have sold only about $3 billion since May, but if they head for the exit India would have no defence.
This is not a repeat of 1991. When India last had a crisis Boris Yeltsin was about to stand on a tank in Moscow and Nirvana was hitting the big time. Things have changed in financial terms, too. Back then India had a fixed exchange rate, which the state almost bankrupted itself trying to defend—it had to fly gold to the Bank of England in return for a loan. Today India has a floating exchange rate and a government with almost no foreign-currency debt. A slump in the currency poses no immediate threat to the government’s solvency.
The pain will be felt in other ways. Private firms that owe most of India’s foreign debt will be under intense strain, particularly if the rupee drops further. Some will go bust. Market interest rates will stay high, causing a liquidity squeeze. All this makes life even tougher for India’s state-owned banks, which already have sour loans equivalent to 10-12% of their loan books. Inflation will rise. And the government’s finances will be under strain as the cost of its subsidies on imported fuel gets bigger.
There is probably little the authorities can do to shore up the currency in the short term. The rupee is one of the world’s most actively traded currencies and at least half the turnover is abroad. Privately, officials reckon the rupee’s fair value, taking into account India’s higher inflation and productivity over the past few years, is a little less than 60 per dollar, so the market has yet to overshoot wildly. Raghuram Rajan, the incoming governor of the RBI, is likely to take a hands-off approach.
That doesn’t mean the government will—or should. On August 19th it banned the import through airports of duty-free flat-screen TVs, which Indians can often be seen heaving through check-in at Dubai. It may seek to raise duties further on gold imports, which Indians are addicted to in part because it is seen as a hedge against inflation. Gross gold imports were 3% of GDP last year, blowing a huge hole in the external finances. History suggests the higher taxes on gold imports are, the worse smuggling gets. But India imports 800-odd tonnes of bullion a year. That’s a lot of gold to hide in suitcases.
The government will also try to persuade the Supreme Court to lift its ban on iron-ore exports, imposed after a series of corruption scams. At its peak this industry generated exports worth about 0.4% of GDP, although experts doubt that mothballed mines can be ramped up fast. The government may also cut fuel subsidies. That would reduce demand for imported fuel and help it hit a fiscal-deficit target of about 7% of GDP (including India’s states).
The longer-term solution to the balance-of-payments problem may be to ramp up India’s manufacturing sector, and thus its industrial exports. But that will take a big improvement in the business climate, not just a cheap currency. Despite the rupee’s 27% tumble in the past three years there is scant sign of global manufacturers shifting production to India.
India’s position could still get worse. But assuming things stabilise, when the official histories come to be written about 2013, what might they say? Most likely that the rupee’s slump caused a severe shock to the economy that made a recovery in growth rates even harder. But perhaps, also, that it prompted a more serious debate about the policies that India needs to become less vulnerable to the whims of an unforgiving world.

0813: Economy: Food Security Bill - Debate - India Malnourished

India’s malnourished : A mess of pottage 

A huge cheap-food scheme to influence voters will not end malnutrition


24 Aug 2013 : Economist 
“HISTORIC” and “unparalleled” were the words Sonia Gandhi, boss of the ruling Congress party, used to describe India’s new food law at a launch in Delhi on August 20th. She promised an end to hunger for the poor. More accurate terms for the law and its introduction would be “expedient” and “chaotic”. The scheme aims to reach 800m of India’s 1.2 billion people, giving each a monthly dole of 5 kilos of rice or wheat, at a nominal price. That makes it the world’s biggest serving of subsidised food. Yet it has been launched amid confusion, cynicism and claims of fiscal irresponsibility.
The food scheme became law in July when the prime minister, Manmohan Singh, Mrs Gandhi’s factotum, introduced it as an ordinance—a rarely used executive power to which Parliament eventually has to agree. Mrs Gandhi fears a thumping at a general election due by the end of May, so Congress is now rushing to push the scheme through. Parliament still has to be persuaded. She sought to tie the bill to the memory of her husband, Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated two decades ago and whose ballyhooed birthday was chosen as the day of the launch.


Opponents tried everything to stop the bill being discussed, but debate was set for August 22nd. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party dares not block the bill for fear of being cast as anti-poor. The party’s de facto leader, Narendra Modi, who used to talk of the need for small government rather than populist handouts, attacked it for promising too little in the way of rations.
The new law is good in parts. It makes sense to enshrine a national obligation to give children a daily hot lunch and new mothers a six-month stipend. It is wise to promote better nutritional help and health care for under-sixes, especially girls, using the existing Integrated Child Development Services. Helping populous states with most of the poor is overdue. Hints that cash transfers might one day replace help-in-kind are also welcome.
But much is rotten about the food scheme. It is too costly. India already spends 900 billion rupees ($14 billion) a year on a bloated system of grain procurement. Half is badly stored and rots, or is stolen. With many new recipients, the cost will rise by nearly two-fifths, to 1% of GDP. That is equivalent to what India spends on public health.
Some argue that it is not a given that the money will always be badly spent. Jean Drèze, a development economist, says that the system will improve because a wider pool of recipients can insist on better service. He cites the experience of recent programmes in Chhattisgarh state.
Yet given the chronic abuse of procurement and food schemes elsewhere, massive theft and waste will surely continue. The food scheme is also badly targeted. Surveys suggest that 2% of Indian households are hungry at some point in the year. Just over 20m people, many in tribal areas or rural bits of northern states, need more help. Yet two-thirds of India’s total population will get the new food aid. That broad splurge of handouts is driven more by raw politics than by development priorities.
It would be better to deal with pitifully bad nutrition than plain hunger. Walk around any north Indian village where grain seems adequate, and stick-thin people offer evidence of how few nutrients are being absorbed. Roughly half of all children under five are malnourished. Save the Children, a British charity, said in June that over 60m children, aged five or younger, are stunted. The consequences can be grim: damage to young brains, a reduced capacity to learn, even death.
Yet helping children requires more than a supply of base calories. A lack of protein or vitamins in diet, dirty water, neglect of girls, lack of education on hygiene and ill-nourished mothers who get pregnant too often: all contribute to the problem. Arvind Virmani, a prominent economist, argues that cleaning up water supplies, especially by building sewage systems, would do far more good against malnutrition than doling out more grain. Just a simple hand-washing campaign could be of huge help.
Even some backers of the new food act admit, in private, that more spending on public health is the greater need. UNICEF, the UN children’s agency, says that diarrhoea kills over 400 young children in India every day. Two-thirds of Indians lack proper sanitation. Some estimates suggest that 70% of drinking water is seriously polluted with sewage. No wonder, says Mr Virmani, infected people fail to absorb nutrients, whatever their diet. Only when votes are in supplying lavatories, and politicians clamour to lend their names to sewage systems, will that change.

0813 : Economy : How India got its funk (The Economist - 24 Aug 2013) - Puneet Singh


India's economy : How India got its funk
India’s economy is in its tightest spot since 1991. Now, as then, the answer is to be bold

Aug 24th 2013 |

IN MAY America’s Federal Reserve hinted that it would soon start to reduce its vast purchases of Treasury bonds. As global investors adjusted to a world without ultra-cheap money, there has been a great sucking of funds from emerging markets. Currencies and shares have tumbled, from Brazil to Indonesia, but one country has been particularly badly hit.
Not so long ago India was celebrated as an economic miracle. In 2008 Manmohan Singh, the prime minister, said growth of 8-9% was India’s new cruising speed. He even predicted the end of the “chronic poverty, ignorance and disease, which has been the fate of millions of our countrymen for centuries”. Today he admits the outlook is difficult. The rupee has tumbled by 13% in three months. The stockmarket is down by a quarter in dollar terms. Borrowing rates are at levels last seen after Lehman Brothers’ demise. Bank shares have sunk.
On August 14th jumpy officials tightened capital controls in an attempt to stop locals taking money out of the country. That scared foreign investors, who worry that India may freeze their funds too. The risk now is of a credit crunch and a self-fulfilling panic that pushes the rupee down much further, fuelling inflation. Policymakers recognise that the country is in its tightest spot since the balance-of-payments crisis of 1991.



How to lose friends and alienate people
India’s troubles are caused partly by global forces beyond its control. But they are also the consequence of a deadly complacency that has led the country to miss a great opportunity.
During the 2003-08 boom, when reforms would have been relatively easy to introduce, the government failed to liberalise markets for labour, energy and land. Infrastructure was not improved enough. Graft and red tape got worse.
Private companies have slashed investment. Growth has slowed to 4-5%, half the rate during the boom. Inflation, at 10%, is worse than in any other big economy. Tycoons who used to cheer India’s rise as a superpower now warn of civil unrest.
As well as undermining 1.2 billion people’s hopes of prosperity, failure to reform dragged down the rupee. Restrictive labour laws and weak infrastructure make it hard for Indian firms to export. Inflation has led people to import gold to protect their savings. Both factors have swollen the current-account deficit, which must be financed by foreign capital. Add in the foreign debt that must be rolled over, and India needs to attract $250 billion in the next year, more than any other vulnerable emerging economy.
A year ago the new finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, tried to kick-start the economy. He has attempted to push key reforms, clear bottlenecks and help foreign investors. But he has lukewarm support within his own party and faces obstructionist opposition. Obstacles to growth, such as fuel shortages for power plants, remain. Foreign firms find nothing has changed. Meanwhile, bad debts have risen at state-run banks: 10-12% of their loans are dud. With an election due by May 2014, some fear that the Congress-led government will now take a more populist tack. A costly plan to subsidise food hints at this.
Stopping the rot
To prevent a slide into crisis, the government needs first to stop making things worse. Those capital controls backfired, yet the urge to tinker runs deep: on August 19th officials slapped duties on televisions lugged in through airports. The authorities must accept that 2013 is not 1991. Then the state nearly bankrupted itself trying to defend a pegged exchange rate. Now the rupee floats, and the state has no foreign debt to speak of. A weaker currency will break some firms with foreign loans, but poses no direct threat to the government’s solvency.
And so the Reserve Bank of India must let the rupee find its own level. The currency has not yet wildly overshot estimates of fundamental value. Raghuram Rajan, the central bank’s incoming head, should aim to control inflation, not micromanage one of the world’s most traded currencies.
Second, the government must get its finances in order. The budget deficit has been as high as 10% of GDP in recent years. This year the government must hold down its deficit (including those of individual states) to 7% of GDP. It is already cutting fuel subsidies, and—notwithstanding the pressures in the run-up to an election—should do so faster.
This is not enough to fix the government’s finances, though. Only 3% of Indians pay income tax, so the government’s tax take is puny. A proposed tax on goods and services, known as GST, would drag more of the economy into the net. It is stuck in endless cross-party talks. If the government can rally itself before the election to push for one long-term reform, this is the one it should go for.
Last, the government, with the central bank, should force the zombie public-sector banks to recapitalise. In 2009 America did “stress tests” to repair its banks. India should follow. Injecting funds into banks would widen the deficit, but the surge in confidence would be worth it.
There are glimmers of hope: exports picked up in July, narrowing the trade gap. But India faces a difficult year, with jittery global markets and an election to boot. Even if it scrapes past the election without a full-blown financial crisis, the next government must do much, much more to change India. Over the coming decade tens of millions of young people will have to find jobs where none currently exists. Generating the growth to create them will mean radical deregulation of protected sectors (of which retail is only the most obvious); breaking up state monopolies, from coal to railways; reforming restrictive labour laws; and overhauling India’s infrastructure of roads, ports and power.

The calamity of 1991 led to liberalising reforms that ended decades of stagnation and allowed a spurt of fast growth. This latest brush with disaster could produce a positive legacy, too, but only if it persuades voters and the next government of the importance of a new round of reforms that deal with the economy’s flaws and unleash its mighty potential

1303 : GS Mains 2013 : Bt cotton Replaces Indigenous Varieties in Flag-making

Bt cotton Replaces Indigenous Varieties in Flag-making

Background
The staple in indigenous varieties of cotton is shorter than Bt cotton, the official explained on the choice of cotton. The plant, a unit of the Khadi and Village Industries Commission, supplies about 1,000 kg cleaned (after a process called roving, to remove dust particles and short fibres) cotton to Garaga Kshetriya Seva Sangh in Dharwad that till 2008 was the sole flag-making unit in the country. The cotton is then hand spun to yarn using a charkha and woven into khadi on handloom. However, Suresh V. Davande, Secretary of KSS, said that he was not aware of the Bt cotton being supplied. At the Karnataka Khadi Gramodyoga Samyukta Sangha at Bengeri where flag making started in 2008, the tricolour is manufactured using khadi made out of a combination of Jayadhar and Bt cotton.
India and Bt Cotton
The data, based on estimates for the year 2010-11, shows that out ofa total area of 111.42 lakh hectares under cotton cultivation, 98.54 lakh hectares are under Bt Cotton, of which Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are the top producers, with 105, 88 and 53 lakh bales of cotton respectively, and 81%, 92% and 98% of their total cotton cultivation area under Bt cotton. Since 2002, Bt cotton has steadily prevailed over India’s cotton fields. Before being legally approved, farmers in Gujarat and Maharashtra were already against this new kind of cotton seed, which, for a higher price, promised pest resistance against a particularly belligerent pest, the white bollworm, and reduced spraying of cotton pesticides. Bt cotton dramatically changed the relationship between farmer and seed. Before Bt, less than 40% seeds used were hybrids. Now over 90% Bt seeds are
Aug 12, 2013
 The Indian tricolour may have lost its indigenous connection with the ‘desi’ cotton variety, with the use of Bt cotton — a proprietary technology of an American seed company.
 Jayadhar, a popular variety of cotton grown in Karnataka that was also earlier used in making flags, has been replaced by Bt cotton.
 Now, flag-making units at Bengeri in Hubli city and Garaga in Dharwad district, which meet the nationwide demand for the tricolour, have been using wholly or partly the khadi derived from Bt cotton.
 Quality of cotton is determined by length, strength and appearance, and Bt cotton is found to provide all these qualities

used. Although making hybrid seeds is a laborious, technical and costly process, these varieties are a result of generations of selective breeding.
On the surface, anti GM activists usually stress the toxicity and the ‘contaminative’ aspects of Bt seeds to push for its ban, but it is really this corporatisation of seed that is at the heart of most friction between activists and crop companies who are now pushing for Bt to be introduced in other plants such as brinjal. It isn’t clear whether paying for hybrid seeds with the Bt gene in it will be as remunerative in brinjal or tomatoes as it is said to be in cotton.
What is Bt Cotton?
The Bt cotton is a genetically modified variety of cotton producing an insecticide. It is produced by Monsanto. The bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) naturally produces a chemical harmful only to a small fraction of insects, most notably the larvae of moths and butterflies, beetles, and flies, and is harmless to other forms of life. The gene coding for Bt toxin has been inserted into cotton, causing cotton to produce this natural insecticide in its tissues. In many regions, the main pest in commercial cotton is the lepidopteran larvae, which is killed by the Bt protein in the transgenic cotton it eats. This eliminates the need to use large amounts of broad-spectrum insecticides to kill lepidopteran pests (some of which have developed pyrethroid resistance). This spares natural insect predators in the farm ecology and further contributes to pest management without use of chemical pesticides.
However, Bt cotton is ineffective against many cotton pests, such as plant bugs, stink bugs, and aphids; depending on circumstances, it may still be desirable to use insecticides against these. A 2006 study done by Cornell researchers and the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy and the Chinese Academy of Science on Bt cotton farming in China found that after seven years, these secondary pests that were normally controlled by pesticide had increased, necessitating the use of pesticides at similar levels to non-Bt cotton, reducing profit for farmers because of the extra expense of GM seeds.

Questions
 What is Bt Cotton? Is it a successful replacement for traditional varieties?
 Why have alternate varieties of cotton evoked strong responses in India?
 Describe the pros and cons of introducing Genetically Modified Organisms into an ecosystem.

References
 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/bt-cotton-replaces-indigenous-varieties-in-flagmaking/article5013506.ece
 http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/NZIDje22uiFUoskfs9FD5M/How-India-became-a-Bt-Cotton-country.html
 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-16/india/41416828_1_bt-cotton-seed-companies-bengal-desi
 http://www.isaaa.org/resources/videos/btcotton/
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bt_cotton

1302: GS 2013 Special : CCAMLR

From ETENIAS (www.etenias.com) 
Conservation talks on Antarctica’s living marine resources fail


Background

The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources- CCAMLR
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was established by an international convention in 1982 with the objective of conserving Antarctic marine life. This was in response to increasing commercial interest in Antarctic krill resources, a keystone component of the Antarctic ecosystem. Being responsible for the conservation of Antarctic marine ecosystems, CCAMLR practises an ecosystem-based management approach. This does not exclude harvesting as long as such harvesting is carried out in a sustainable manner and takes account of the effects of fishing on other components of the ecosystem.

CCAMLR is an international commission with 25 Members and 11 more countries have acceded to the Convention. Based on the best available scientific information, the Commission agrees on a set of conservation measures that determine the use of marine living resources in the Antarctic.

The key institutional components of CCAMLR are:
• the CAMLR Convention which came into force on 7th April, 1982
• a decision-making body, the Commission
• a scientific committee which advises the Commission using the best available science
• Conservation measures and resolutions
• CCAMLR's membership and provisions for international cooperation and collaboration
• a secretariat based in Hobart, Tasmania, that supports the work of the Commission.
What are Marine Protected Areas?
A marine protected area (MPA) is essentially a space in the ocean where human activities are more strictly regulated than in the surrounding waters (similar to parks we have on land). These places are given special protection for natural or historic marine resources by local, state, territorial, native,
Aug 08, 2013
The commission for conservation of Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR) in an extraordinary meeting held at Bremerhaven, recently, failed to reach any concrete agreement on the two proposals put forward for creation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Antarctic. CCAMLR’s members are drawn from 24 countries and the European Union. The meeting was a follow up to last year’s CCAMLR meeting in Hobart, Australia, which also concluded without any consensus on marine protected areas for the Antarctic.

Conservation talks on Antarctica’s living marine resources fail
Background
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources- CCAMLR
The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was established by an international convention in 1982 with the objective of conserving Antarctic marine life. This was in response to increasing commercial interest in Antarctic krill resources, a keystone component of the Antarctic ecosystem. Being responsible for the conservation of Antarctic marine ecosystems, CCAMLR practises an ecosystem-based management approach. This does not exclude harvesting as long as such harvesting is carried out in a sustainable manner and takes account of the effects of fishing on other components of the ecosystem.
CCAMLR is an international commission with 25 Members and 11 more countries have acceded to the Convention. Based on the best available scientific information, the Commission agrees on a set of conservation measures that determine the use of marine living resources in the Antarctic. The key institutional components of CCAMLR are:
• the CAMLR Convention which came into force on 7th April, 1982
• a decision-making body, the Commission
• a scientific committee which advises the Commission using the best available science
• Conservation measures and resolutions
• CCAMLR's membership and provisions for international cooperation and collaboration
• a secretariat based in Hobart, Tasmania, that supports the work of the Commission.
What are Marine Protected Areas?
A marine protected area (MPA) is essentially a space in the ocean where human activities are more strictly regulated than in the surrounding waters (similar to parks we have on land). These places are given special protection for natural or historic marine resources by local, state, territorial, native,
Aug 08, 2013
The commission for conservation of Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR) in an extraordinary meeting held at Bremerhaven, recently, failed to reach any concrete agreement on the two proposals put forward for creation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Antarctic. CCAMLR’s members are drawn from 24 countries and the European Union. The meeting was a follow up to last year’s CCAMLR meeting in Hobart, Australia, which also concluded without any consensus on marine protected areas for the Antarctic.


regional, or national authorities. Authorities differ substantially from nation to nation. There are many formal definitions of marine protected areas, but the most broadly used definition is the IUCN definition: 'A clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.'
Types of MPA
There are many kinds of marine protected areas that meet this broad definition, and which can have a wide range of conservation objectives. Such objectives can include:
Ecological objectives:
• ensuring the long-term viability and maintaining the genetic diversity of marine species and systems;
• protecting depleted, threatened, rare or endangered species and populations;
• preserving habitats considered critical for the survival and/or lifecycles of species, including economically important species and
• preventing outside activities from detrimentally affecting the marine protected areas
Human objectives:
• providing for the continued welfare of people affected by the creation of marine protected areas;
• preserving, protecting, and managing historical and cultural sites and natural aesthetic values of marine and estuarine areas, for present and future generations;
• facilitating the interpretation of marine and estuarine systems for the purposes of conservation, education and tourism;
• accommodating with appropriate management systems a broad spectrum of human activities compatible with the primary goal in marine and estuarine settings; and
• providing for research and training, and for monitoring the environmental effect of human activities, including the direct and indirect effects of development and adjacent land-use practices.
Some people confuse marine reserves, where extraction of any resources is prohibited (no-take), as the only type of MPA. MPAs may include marine reserves, as well as other zones in which partial protection is afforded (seasonal closures, catch limits, etc.). Many MPAs are multiple-use areas, where a variety of uses are allowed. For example, there are many different kinds of MPAs in U.S. waters including national parks, wildlife refuges, monuments and marine sanctuaries, fisheries closures, critical habitat, habitat areas of particular concern, state parks, conservation areas, estuarine reserves and preserves, and numerous others. While a few sites exist as no-take marine reserves, the vast majority of MPAs, both in terms of numbers and area, are open for fishing, diving, boating, and other recreational and commercial uses.

Questions
• What are Marine Protected Areas?
• What is the role of The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in ensuring conservation activities in the Marine Protected areas?
• Why does the Indian marine area management have to be an extensive one over large areas?

References
• http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/conservation-talks-on-antarcticas-living-marine-resources-fail/article4999682.ece
• http://www.ccamlr.org/en/organisation/about-ccamlr
• http://www.protectplanetocean.org/introduction/introbox/mpas/introduction-item.html
• http://marineprotectedareas.noaa.gov/